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L'article 96 de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1867 
The Proposed Section 96B: 
An Ill-Conceived Reform 
Destined to Failure** 
Roderick A. MACDONALD * 
L'objet de cette étude est d'identifier la véritable fin de l'amendement 
proposé par le gouvernement. L'article 96B prétend-il détruire l'hégémonie des 
cours supérieures ? Le but recherché par cet article est-il de permettre aux 
provinces de créer un vaste réseau de tribunaux spécialisés ? Le seul effet de 
l'article 96B serait-il d'imposer une barrière au pouvoir de surveillance des 
cours supérieures ? 
L'article 96B semble déficient et mal rédigé. La promulgation de cet 
amendement entraînerait une multiplication de tribunaux inférieurs dont la 
structure laisserait à désirer en plus d'encourager une vaste distribution de 
juridictions ainsi qu'une délégation subjective de pouvoirs. Même si l'on croit 
que l'article 96B(2) protège les attributs distinctifs des cours supérieures, la 
porte est néanmoins ouverte aux provinces pour exploiter l'amendement. Il en 
découlerait une politisation accrue des cours supérieures. 
Les articles 96 à 101 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne procurent pas 
une garantie constitutionnelle de l'indépendance judiciaire. L'auteur, après 
avoir étudié l'amendement 96B, conclut qu'il ne peut être considéré sérieusement 
comme étant une solution valable aux problèmes soulevés par ces articles. 
* Dean, Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
** This essay is a revised version of a speech delivered under the title «L'article 96B: une 
réforme mal conçue qui suscite de faux espoirs», on March 30, 1984 at the Conference on 
The Reform of Federal Institutions. 
I should like to thank my colleagues Yves-Marie Morrissette and Suzanne Birks, as well as 
my research assistant, Marc Barbeau, for their assistance in preparing this text. They are, of 
course, not to be held accountable for any views expressed herein. 
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Introduction 
The fact that section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 has recently 
become one of the most litigated provisions of the statute is no great surprise 
to constitutional and administrative law zealots1. Other legal scholars, 
however, must see a certain perversity in the fact that a text stating simply 
« [t]he Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District 
and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate 
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick » should give rise to so much controversy. 
Similar language in respect of appointment to the Senate2 has generated 
hardly any judicial (as opposed to political) disputes3. Yet, in this very 
1. The jurisprudence and doctrine on section 96 are vast. For a brief review see, most recently, 
the papers by Professors Pépin and Duple in this issue of the Cahiers de droit. See also infra, 
note 5. 
2. Section 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides : 
« The Governor General shall from time to time, in the Queen's name, by instrument under 
the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified persons to the Senate ; and, subject to the 
provisions of this Act, every person so summoned shall become and be a member of the 
Senate and a Senator. » 
The language of sections 24 and 96 is to be contrasted with that of sections 58 and 66 which 
provide, respectively, for the appointment of Lieutenant-Governors and Administrators 
not by the Governor General, but by the Governor General in Council. The difference, 
although probably insignificant today, is in my view important for an understanding of the 
underlying political structure of section 96. 
3. See, for rare examples of litigation in respect of the Senate, Reference Legislative Authority 
of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate, (1979) 102 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) ; Edwards v. 
A.G. Canada, [19301 A.C. 124 (P.C.). See also R.A. M A C K A V , The Unreformed Senate of 
Canada (rev. ed.) Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1963, and compare E.A. FORSEY, 
Freedom and Order, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1974, p. 227 on the question of 
provincial Upper Houses. 
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observation lies much of the explanation for what has come to be known as 
the « section 96 problem ». 
While both Senate and superior courts were seen as national institutions, 
their projected roles have not been realized as originally conceived. The 
Senate was designed to perform a political role, in part reflecting provincial 
and regional concerns on the national scene ; today it functions in fact 
largely as a non-political body. By contrast, the senior judicial tribunals (and 
especially the superior courts) were conceived initially as non-political 
institutions, committed to preserving the «objective» values of the Rule of 
Law ; yet over the years they have become one of our most politicized 
governmental organs. The dissipation of the Senate's political role produces 
little more than cries for its abolition. But our belated recognition of the 
political structure of adjudication generates significant controversy. For 
there are few events more traumatic for a constitutional state than the 
delegation of manifestly political prerogatives to a body structurally inapt to 
exercise them. 
Compounding what sociologists would characterize as the cognitive 
dissonance evoked by the changed role of the superior courts is the ideology 
of legal liberalism, which ascribes to the senior judiciary an independence 
and neutrality not immediately evident to certain observers of its work. For 
example, where the consequence of the ordinary exercise of a national 
institution's powers is the frustration of bona fide provincial legislative 
initiative, suspicion of partiality is understandable. What is more, the level of 
government least in need of a constitutional escape hatch (given its ordinary 
jurisdiction) is that which is permitted, via section 101, to overcome any 
restraints arising from section 96. 
These observations suggest why the current volume of section 96 
litigation surprises few experts. But other contemporary developments 
relating to the section are genuinely perplexing. The unwillingness of the 
federal government to take a tough stand on the constitutional principle 
enshrined by section 96, the seeming duplicity of some provincial adminis-
trations in arguing for flexibility in its application, and the frequently erratic 
behaviour of the judiciary itself (including the Supreme Court) in interpreting 
section 96 are only the three most evident elements to this puzzlement. 
By far the most intriguing non-judicial development of recent years in 
this field, and certainly that which most clearly illustrates each of the 
confounding elements in section 96 speculation, is the proposal advanced in 
the Discussion Paper, The Constitution of Canada : A suggested amendment 
relating to provincial administrative tribunals*. This document argues, as a 
4. Supply and Services, Canada 1983, Cat. No. J2-47/1983. 
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partial solution to the « section 96 problem », for the addition of a section 96B 
to the Constitution Act, 1867. This section would provide : 
96B. (1) Notwithstanding section 96, the Legislature of each Province may 
confer on any tribunal, board, commission or authority, other than a court, 
established pursuant to the laws of the Province, concurrent or exclusive 
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the legislative authority of the 
Province. 
(2) Any decision of a tribunal, board, commission or authority on which 
any jurisdiction of a superior court is conferred under subsection ( 1 ) is subject 
to review by a superior court of the Province for want or excess of jurisdiction. 
While much could be said both about the reality of the alleged section 96 
problem and about the possibility or desirability of amending this section at 
all, the remarks which follow will be restricted to a critique of these most 
recent federal proposals. Much sophisticated empirical work needs to be 
done before anyone can confidently assert that the existing section creates 
insoluble problems of public administration. More importantly, one would 
think that any proposals for reforming section 96 should call for a thorough 
re-examination of all the Judicature sections of the Constitution. In other 
words, absent an analysis of the nature of adjudication, of legal normativity 
and of the basic theory of the modern federal state one cannot say either that 
there is, in fact, a section 96 problem, or that, if there is a problem, it is the 
one politicians are arguing about. It follows that any reform of section 96 
must be preceded by considerably more than a simple reconsideration of 
federal/provincial relations in matters of Judicature; for section 96 primarily 
raises issues of constitutional theory and legal ideology, not issues of 
federalism 5. 
5. One might refer to discussions in The Federalist Papers nos. 78-83, R.B. UNGER, Law in 
Modern Society, New York, Free Press, 1976, and the essays in D. KAIRYS, The Politics of 
Law, New York, Pantheon Books, 1982 for development of this theme. See also D.P. JONES, 
« A Constitutionally Guaranteed Role for the Courts», ( 1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 669. 
My colleague Suzanne Birks argues in an article forthcoming in the Mi Gill Law Journal that 
there is a marked difference in the approach of Quebec and non-Quebec commentators. 
For non-Quebec scholars section 96 has not been perceived as much of a problem, 
especially because its major impact has been in the area of administrative tribunals: see 
P.W. HOGG, « Is judicial review of administrative action guaranteed by the B.N.A. Act?», 
( 1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 716. In Quebec, however, quite the reverse is true because, starting 
with Duplcssis' abolition of the County Courts in 1953, section 96 has impeded the 
provincial government from enlarging the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court so as to make 
it a quasi-Superior court : see G. PÉPIN, •• Chronique», (1978) 38 R. du b. 818. 
This point was first made by B. LASKIN, « Municipal Tax Assessment and Section 96 of the 
B.N.A. Act : The Olympia Bowling Alleys Case »,(1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 993, and seems to 
explain, more or less, the approval of tribunals in Dupont, Mississauga, Tomko, and Massey-
Icrguson, but the disapproval of courts in Victoria Medical Building, Chicoulimi, Farrah, 
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To initiates to the 20th century processes of Law Reform as a field of 
inquiry separate from Constitutional amendment, there can be little doubt 
the 1983 federal proposals should be typecast as « bad» law reform6. Indeed, 
criticism may be pitched at three different levels : the proposals are no more 
than a legislative band-aid — incomplete and insensitive to the sociopolitical 
context into which they are to be projected ; they are also constitutional in 
character — once enacted they will be protected by various manner and form 
requirements designed to impede amendment ; lastly, they are simply flawed 
from the point of view of legal technique — the distinctions which it is 
necessary to draw in order to apply these proposals to actual controversies 
can be sustained neither in theory nor in practice. 
In what ways may it be said that the MacGuigan proposals are no more 
than a temporary or stop-gap solution to the most obvious difficulties posed 
by recent judicial interpretations of 96? One might essay a response by 
noting that, generally speaking, section 96 has been invoked to limit 
provincial legislative authority in three main areas : the conferral of juris-
diction (i) upon provincial family courts, (ii) upon provincial court judges in 
matters relating to the criminal law, and (iii) upon provincially-created 
administrative tribunals. 
Not surprisingly, where the authority of provincial courts is in issue, 
various modi vivendi have been negotiated. Today, Unified Family Courts 
and Unified Criminal Courts seem to have accommodated most provincial 
concerns in two of the three section 96 problem areas. In other words, except 
in Quebec there does not seem to have been a general dissatisfaction with the 
underlying premises of section 96 whenever it affects what are, in essence, 
judicial tribunals7. The professional ideology of lawyers apparently compen-
sates for the natural competitiveness between provincial and federal offices 
of the Attorney-General. 
Crevier, Reference re Family Relations Act and McEvoy. Section 96 is invoked not by a 
federal body for the express purpose of limiting provincial autonomy, but rather by a 
judicial body anxious to maintain its hegemony. The issue, as the assault on the Federal 
Court through Quebec North Shore, Law Society ofB. C. and l'Anglais confirms, is primarily 
one of legal and constitutional theory, not federalism. 
6. The criteria by which law reform initiatives should be judged are elaborated in R.A. SAMEK, 
«A Case for Social Law Reform», (1977) 55 Can. Bar Rev. 409. 
7. As an aside, it may be that a certain judicial realism by the Supreme Court in the accretion 
of the monetary jurisdiction of the Quebec Provincial Court, which now has a monetary 
jurisdiction of some $15,000, has prevented these questions from becoming an issue in 
Quebec where ordinary judicial-type jurisdiction is in issue: see Reference re: Constitu-
tionality of the Act Respecting the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court, [1965] S.C.R. 772. 
It should be noted, however, that the continuing attempt to use the Provincial Court in 
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As currently drafted, section 96B addresses only the third major area 
where judicial interpretations of section 96 have generated extensive litiga-
tion. It proposes an exception to section 96 where a provincial administrative 
tribunal is created. This, of course, perfectly illustrates the band-aid nature 
of the reform : law reformers simply ask « what elements of the interpretation 
of section 96 are most problematic ? » and then they attempt to carve out an 
exception to the section to deal with them. Nowhere is an effort made to get 
at the underlying disputes of which section 96 litigation is merely sympto-
matic. Surely, when the legislative, as opposed to contractual (i.e. inter-
governmental accord) or judicial (i.e. the law « working itself pure»), mode 
of law reform is employed, a more thorough analysis and justification of 
suggested amendments is indicated. 
The fact that these proposals necessarily will have a constitutional 
character gives rise to a second, closely-related, basis for criticism. At the 
best of times, constitutional amendment is laborious and fraught with 
unexpected diversions. Today, as those who have tried to work their way 
through the labyrinth of amending formulae set out in the Canada Act surely 
would acknowledge, one ought to be even more reticent about entrenching 
housekeeping proposals into a basic constitutional document. Yet, far from 
displaying the greater constitutional maturity which supporters of the 
Charter of Rights confidently predicted would emerge upon adoption of the 
Trudeau package, the proponents of section 96B simply repeat what has 
become the Canadian penchant for treating a constitution like an ordinary 
statute. The amendment is written in jargon, invites rote interpretation and 
encourages haphazard re-amendment. 
If there are indeed problems of public administration flowing from 
certain Supreme Court decisions concerning the bearing of section 96 upon 
provincial administrative tribunals (and assuming this problem to be 
recognized by both federal and provincial governments, as opposed to being 
merely a provincial peeve) can there not be solutions to these specific 
problems which avoid recourse to constitutional amendment ? For example, 
to overcome the perceived unworkability of the result reached in the 
Residential Tenancies case " any one of at least three avenues are open : a 
Residential Tenancies Commission on the model of the Unified Family 
Court could be established ; an expedient similar to that put in place for 
Quebec as an appellate administrative tribunal evidences dissatisfaction with the implica-
tions ul section 96 for judicial bodies. Moreover, certain other provincial Attorney's 
General, notably Mr. McMurtry of Ontario, are unhappy with the current situation even in 
respect of family courts. 
8. Reference re Residential Tenancies Acl,(,W%\) 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554 (S.C.C.). 
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Mechanic's Liens evaluations (i.e. the delegation of certain fact-finding tasks 
to officials who then report to a federal nominee) could be adopted ; or a 
separate division of the Supreme or County Court of Ontario, whose 
members would be jointly nominated by federal and provincial governments 
could be instituted. Until a global reconsideration of the judicial power is 
undertaken, it is better to deal with problems arising from section 96 
discretely and through consensus, rather than through constitutional 
amendment of a general legislative character. 
These proposals may also be criticized from the perspective of legal 
technique. Section 96B suffers the two recurrent afflictions of modern 
legislative law reform : historicism and intellectualism. The historicist fallacy 
involves the unthinking projection of current understandings and pre-
occupations onto past events and prior texts. In my view, the apparent 
willingness of federal authorities to modify the constitution in the manner 
suggested by the MacGuigan proposals (especially as the amendment is 
explained in the Discussion Paper) may be attributed to an historically 
inaccurate interpretation of section 96. By not appreciating (from the 
perspective of 1867) why section 96 was formulated in its exact terms, one 
misses the political reality which led to its original enactment, and the 
diversity of values it enshrines. 
The vice of intellectualism is a paradox, for it does not mean that the 
proposals are too theoretical. Quite the contrary. Intellectualism describes 
the act of positing concepts and categories which are incoherent, and the 
process of adopting dichotomies which are false, both usually on the basis of 
insufficient theoretical investigation and rigour. The vice is neatly encapsu-
lated in the axiom : the idea which is good in theory but bad in practice, is 
bad in theory. In the case of the MacGuigan proposals, intellectualism 
results in a text which requires the drawing of unworkable distinctions. 
Any one of the above concerns should counsel prudence in the pursuit 
of the reform of section 96 proposed in the Discussion Paper. However, the 
political reality in Canada today is such that neither of the first two lines of 
criticism are likely to be of much moment. I shall, therefore, limit my 
remarks to what may be termed an historical and jurisprudential analysis. 
This is not because I believe that even this third type of critique will have any 
influence upon federal decision-makers. Rather I do so because its absence in 
the past has permitted debate to proceed at such a low level that proposals as 
seriously flawed as those now on the table can be put forward seriously9. 
9. For similar comments in a slightly different context see S.A. SCOTT, <• Bill C-60 : or, how not 
to draft a constitution», (1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 587. 
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1. Understanding Section 96: Historicist Fallacies 
It is currently fashionable in legal circles to advocate a new mythology 
of section 96. The Charter of Rights has given impetus to this fashion, and 
the Discussion Paper accompanying the federal proposals repeats uncritically 
the revisionist dogma. Two main themes recur is this modern analysis : first, 
the conception that the basic policy originally sustaining the enactment of 
section 96 was the protection of civil libertarian values, and in particular, the 
independence of the judiciary ; and second, the view that section 96 was 
intended to operate as a restraint upon the provincial and federal govern-
ments, balancing their authority in matters of Judicature. In my view, both 
these perspectives are false, and contribute to the current confusion about 
how best to reform section 96. 
1.1. Judicial Independence 
Since first announced systematically in 195610 the view that the 
Governor General's appointing power under section 96 is part of a 
constitutional structure which guarantees judicial independence has attracted 
several adherents". In this section I do not argue either for or against the 
desirability of a constitutional guarantee of judicial independence; I claim 
only that, as a matter of practice, section 96 et seq do not provide such a 
guarantee, and that, as a matter of historical interpretation, they were not 
primarily intended to do so (at least in the sense that modern glossators 
assert). 
The thesis relating section 96 to modern conceptions of judicial 
independence is purely formal. It flows from the belief that executive 
appointment, selection from the appropriate bar, life-time tenure, and 
protection of salary and pension entitlements serve to insulate section 96 
judges from political pressure. Of course, there is some justification for this 
view (as the struggle leading up to the Acts of Settlement in 1701 attests), and 
on occasion the Privy Council '2 and the Supreme Court l3 seem to have said 
as much. But the reality is far more subtle than many contemporary 
observers are prepared to acknowledge. Long before the Berger u, Drury 
10. See W.R. Li DERMAN, <• The Independence of the Judiciary», (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769 
and 1139. 
11. See most recently R. ELLIOT, •< Constitutional Law — Judicature — Is Section 96 Binding 
on Parliament »,(1982) 16 U. B.C. Law Rev. 313; G. LEHOUX, « L'arrêt McEvoy»,( 1983) 14 
R.G.D. 169. 
12. Marlineau & Sons v. Montreal, [1932] A.C. 113. 
13. McEvoyv. A. G.N.B., ( 1983) 148 D.L.R. (3d) 25 (S.C.C.). 
14. For complete documentation on the Berger affair see (1983) 28 McGill L.J. 378. 
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and Ouellet affairs made the point obvious, instances of political interference 
in particular judicial processes were not infrequent. What is more, the 
politics of the judicial appointment process have been well understood for 
many years ; the current round of patronage is merely a particularly 
egregious example. 
In other words, proponents of the judicial independence thesis are 
engaged in a neat play on words : to be sure, the ideology of adjudication is 
such that direct political interference in the decision of actual controversies is 
impeded; but sections 96 et seq explicitly enhance a particular ideological 
bias. Only a complete failure to consider this reality can explain the 
following pronouncement of the Supreme Court : 
The traditional independence of English superior court judges has been raised 
to the level of a fundamental principle of our federal system by the Constitution 
Act, 1982 and cannot have less importance and force in the administration of 
criminal law than in case of civil matters. Under the Canadian Constitution the 
superior courts are independent of both levels of government. The provinces 
constitute, maintain and organize the superior courts ; the federal authority 
appoints the judges. The judicature sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 
guarantee the independence of the superior courts ; they apply to Parliament as 
well as to the provincial Legislatures ". 
Surely, given constitutional convention, appointment by the Governor 
General is not today a particularly ironclad guarantee of judicial inde-
pendence in the sense of political or ideological neutrality. What is more, in 
my view section 96 was intended precisely to ensure ideological non-
neutrality. 
Adherents to the judicial independence thesis also justify their claim 
through an appeal to the complementary Judicature provisions of the Act of 
1867, sections 97-100. But again, the requirements of these sections are 
merely formal. Drawing judges from local Bar Associations does less to 
enhance judicial independence than it does to enshrine the professional 
ideology of lawyers. In an age of government-fueled inflation the formality 
of salary establishment has been effectively neutralized. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the various provincial Judges Acts, the Supreme Court Act and 
principles of the common law have been invoked more frequently and more 
successfully against arbitrary dismissals than the joint address provision of 
section 99. Whatever independence of the judiciary in the liberal state may 
mean, it is difficult to see that reality reflected in any general theory 
derivable from sections 96-100. 
15. Supra, note 13, p. 38. 
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Nevertheless, modem theorists need not offer empirical support for 
their teleological claim about section 96. The section may simply have failed 
in its purpose. On the other hand, and this is the gravamen of the present 
discussion, the ascription of a civil libertarian objective to the Judicature 
sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 hides important elements of the context 
within which the statute was enacted16. If there were indeed a political 
dispute relating to the judiciary in 1867, it was not found primarily in liberal 
notions of the tri-partite state and borrowed notions of federal balancing; it 
was rather to be found in the struggle for popular and responsible 
government — the irony being that section 96 is evidence that this particular 
struggle was lost, not won, by the 19th century civil libertarians. 
Modern analysts who see section 96 as a protection against the 
hegemonic power of Family Compact or Chateau Clique conveniently forget 
who, in fact, were supporting the federation, and who were especially 
desirous of a legislative union. Far from an attempt to break the power of 
local oligarchs, the Judicature sections of the Act of 1867 reflected an 
opposite goal. Among the main objectives of sections 96-100 was the desire 
to insulate the appointment of superior court judges from the ravages of 
unbridled democracy, be this reflected in the election of judges or the 
exertion of local pressures upon the judiciary, or be this in an assertion of 
Parliamentary control. Various structural features of the Constitution Act, 
1867 illustrate this ambition : appointment by the Governor General alone, 
(that is, neither appointment by the Governor-in-Council, nor the Lieutenant-
Governor-in-Council, nor election by the populace) consolidates executive 
power; the requirement that salaries be fixed by Parliament (rather than 
paid through fees of litigants, or from local coffers) helps insulate the courts 
from the pressure exerted by their clientele, and the demands of the 
marketplace ; and the joint address process is a mechanism for diluting the 
power of the elected House of Commons with the voices of « rationality 
and conservatism» of the appointed Senate, as well as for distancing judicial 
employment from municipal squabbling. 
The defect of much modern thinking about section 96 is (i) its 
preoccupation with reading into the Judicature provisions of the Act of 1867 
an abstract, but sophisticated, late 20lh century liberal view of judicial 
independence, and (ii) its ignorance of the other political values promoted by 
16. See the selections in P.B. WAITE, The Confederation Debates in the province of Canada, 
Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1963. Fora detailed account of the events leading up to 
the enactment of section 96 see W.A. ANGUS, «Judicial Selection in Canada — The 
Historical Perspective» (unpublished paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Association of Law Teachers, June 10, 1966). 
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the sections. Far from consecrating a conception of judicial independence 
grounded in the separation of executive and judicial functions, section 96 
served to consolidate political authority by ensuring the ideological commit-
ment of the senior judiciary to traditional values such as private property, 
fault-based liability and markets ". 
1.2. Balancing Federal and Political Judicature Powers 
A second revisionist perspective of the Discussion Paper is revealed in 
its claim that the « dual regime, where both orders of government are 
involved in the operation of the superior, district and county courts, 
strengthens the appearance of independence of these courts.»18 Like the 
misreading of section 96 which re-interprets the nature of the Governor 
General's role in the appointment process this analysis also flows from a 
latter-day conception of what the section ought to have been designed to 
accomplish. 
To begin with, one might ask precisely how a dual appointment regime 
serves the interests of judicial independence? Certainly recent events in 
Saskatchewan illustrate the use of the provisions of section 92(14) respecting 
the «constitution, maintenance and organization» of courts to precisely the 
reverse effect, namely to politicize the process doubly ". Unless one claims 
that, by definition, all possible political interests are exhausted in the 
positions taken by the two levels of government, and that, also by definition, 
compromise between all possible political positions means that a process 
becomes de-politicized (both highly dubious propositions), the enhancement 
of judicial independence hardly can be viewed as a consequence of the dual 
appointment regime. 
There is yet another, and perhaps less sincere, claim which is made for 
the dual system. Proponents suggest that it reflects and promotes the values 
of federalism (in particular a sharing of political power between national and 
provincial governments) without, at the same time, committing Canada to 
the confusions of a truly dual court system, as in the United States20. No 
doubt the maintenance of an omnicompetent superior court of general 
17. I have discussed this idea at length in « Regulation by Regulations in Canada Since 1945 » a 
paper prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada. 
18. Supra, note 4, p. 1. 
19. I refer, of course, to the government's refusal to authorize the appointment of new Superior 
Court justices because it is dissatisfied with its role in the selection of such judges. 
20. Supra, note 4, p. 7. 
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jurisdiction preserves the facade of a unitary court system. But, one might 
well ask, how is our current system of multiple administrative tribunals, each 
with exclusive original jurisdiction, different from the dual court system 
prevailing in the United States? That is, there is no functional distinction to 
be drawn between the apportionment of jurisdiction through judicial review 
applications and the apportionment of jurisdiction as between state and 
federal courts by the Supreme Court. What is more, Parliament itself took a 
large step towards the creation of a dual regime when it established the 
Federal Court. 
One might also note that, if a dual regime truly enhances the values of 
federalism to the extent claimed, surely these virtues are equally worthy of 
protection in the lowest provincial courts (such as Small Claims Courts), as 
well as in the highest federal courts (including the Supreme Court). To my 
knowledge, federal proponents of the dual appointment regime typically do 
not make any such claims. The Discussion Paper also intimates that any dual 
regime which dissociates appointment and judicial organization is the 
natural perfection of a Judicature system. To test this assertion, one might 
speculate whether federal policy-makers would so exalt the wisdom of the 
present system if the Lieutenant-Governors were to appoint superior court 
judges and Parliament were to constitute, maintain and organize the courts. 
Adulation of the existing dual regime for the reasons given by federal 
authorities also misses the original significance in the titulary of the 
appointing power. This power was not placed in the Parliament's hands, nor 
even assigned to the Governor in Council. It was, and is, exercisable by the 
Governor General, in his own name. Of course, in 1984 this means that the 
Prime Minister effectively controls the appointment process, but the theory 
of section 96 remains unchanged. The dual regime had almost nothing to do 
with the division of legislative authority between federal and provincial 
Parliaments, and very little to do with the distribution of executive powers 
between provincial and federal governments. It was intended to keep the 
process of appointments to senior judicial offices firmly in the hands of the 
most reliable executive actor. After all, the Governor General is the Queen's 
direct representative and is named by her, unlike the Lieutenant-Governors, 
who are nominated by the Governor-in-Council21. 
Finally, the Discussion Paper makes the dubious claim that section 96 
was designed to balance federal and provincial authority in respect of the 
judicial power. Whatever may be the case in 1984, now that the Supreme 
21. The irony is that, in trying to balance concerns for judicial independence and federal 
duality, the vesting of authority in the Governor General does not really achieve either 
goal. 
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Court has rewritten the Judicature provisions of the Act of 186722 and taken 
on its Charter of Rights jurisdiction, it is surely the case, upon an ordinary 
reading of the Constitution Act, 1867, that far from an equalization of 
powers, a preponderance was to be accorded to the federal authority in both 
the distribution of legislative powers and the establishment of the judiciary2i. 
To compare the scope of sections 91 and 92 is to show where legislative 
hegemony was thought best to lie. Moreover, sections 56, 90 and 95 are 
conclusive evidence that federal authority (be it the Governor-General or the 
Parliament of Canada) was to be accorded both a veto on provincial 
enactments (sections 56 and 90) and a pre-emptive right on certain elements 
of provincial legislative competence (sections 94 and 95). 
In matters of Judicature, sections 93, 94, 96 and 101 are analogous 
hegemonic provisions. The former two provisions are today probably spent, 
but they reflect the centralist preoccupation prevalent at Confederation. 
Section 96 was meant to minimize provincial (even more than federal) 
legislative influence upon nominations to senior judicial positions and 
section 101, in combination with the opening provisions of sections 91 and 
section 94, was intended to ensure that Parliament maintained authority 
over the organization of courts whenever the national interest or the 
uniformity of judicial interpretation so required. 
In other words, given its interrelationship with other Judicature pro-
visions, section 96 should not be seen as intended to impose equal restrictions 
on both federal and provincial legislatures. The proponents of a legislative 
union may well have failed to establish a unitary Parliament, but they did 
achieve a judicial union under the control of the Governor General. Today, 
the federal Parliament may deploy section 101 to create its own courts to 
administer its own laws. While the provinces may do likewise under 
section 92(14), the office holders of superior and county courts must remain 
as federal nominees under section 96. Finally, until the McEvoy decision, it 
was undoubted that Parliament had authority to delegate jurisdiction to 
administer statutes passed under section 91 to anyone it pleased, without the 
necessity of establishing a section 101 court24. Whatever may now be 
22. See in particular, Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. C.P.R., (1976) 71 D.L.R. (3d) 111 
(S.C.C.); McEvoy v. A.G.N.B., (1983) 148 D.L.R. (3d) 25 (S.C.C.); Canada Labour Relations 
Board v. Paul l'Anglais, (1983) 146 D.L.R. (3d) 202. 
23. This point is trite, in respect of legislative powers : see R.M. DAWSON, The Government of 
Canada, 4th ed., Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 30-32. 
24. The paradox of McEvoy, the holding of which seems directly at odds with this third 
proposition, is that it points the law down a patch which is analytically tortuous. For 
example, does the case mean that provincially appointed judges can no longer sit on 
extradition matters? And why is it that provincial judges may, in the exercise of their 
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desirable in view of the changed relationship between Prime Minister and 
Governor-General, and the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, it was not the case in 1867 that the provinces struck a deal which 
imposed restrictions upon the central authorities analogous to those implied 
by section 96, or that they saw the dual regime as an example of federal 
balancing. 
1.3. Section 96 Reconsidered 
There is always a danger in recalling sinners to the true way, and it is not 
my purpose here to claim that values such as judicial independence and 
equal restraint upon both federal and provincial authorities in matters of 
Judicature are unworthy. Nor do I pretend that courts have not bought the 
new rhetoric of section 96. Least of all do I claim that the Charter of Rights 
has not altered the structure of Judicature in such a way that the agenda 
ascribed to section 96 by revisionist theorists has now been assured. What is 
distressing, however, is that the federal proposals set out in the Discussion 
Paper appear to be based solely upon this revisionist dogma. To accept these 
modern claims is to ignore the variety of purposes served by section 96 ; and 
to ignore these multiple purposes is to invite false prescriptions for over-
coming its defects. 
A simple example will illustrate the dangers of historicism. Imagine that 
the Parliament of Canada wishes to reconsider the scheme of Family 
Allowances. How different proposals for reform would be if the prime 
purpose of the scheme were held to be « subsidy of children » (as it is today), 
rather than «stimulation of post-War consumer spending» (as it was in 
1945). It may well be that it is no longer necessary to stimulate consumer 
spending, but to fail to take such an objective into account is certain to 
produce reforms which have unexpected consequences25. 
In light of their explanation of the purposes of section 96, one wonders 
if the federal proponents of section 96B truly understand the remarkable 
shifting of political power which their proposals may well bring about. Even 
though we live in an era far removed from the context in which it was 
absolute jurisdiction under the Criminal Code, sit on cases where persons may be 
incarcerated for up to five years, while in civil cases the limits of provincial jurisdiction end 
in many provinces with the Small Claims courts? Of course, in Quebec, the absence of 
County Courts permits the legislature to bump the jurisdiction of the provincial court to 
$15,000, but still, who would trade $15,001 for five years in prison? 
25. An excellent jurisprudential discussion of this problem may be found in L.L. FULLER, 
Anatomy of the Law, New York, The New American Library, 1968, p. 36-39. See also. 
GORDON, « Historicism in Legal Scholarship», (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1017. 
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originally given, the counsel of Bishop Hoadly has a contemporary ring : not 
he who first made the law, but he who interprets it is the true law-giver. 
While one may decide that the entrenchment of liberal notions of judicial 
independence in the Constitution is a desirable objective, to do it by way of 
an amendment which undermines judicial power seems somewhat para-
doxical. 
2. Understanding Section 96B : 
Intellectualist Misconceptions 
Even were one ready to accept the revisionist formulation of the original 
purposes of section 96 set out in the Discussion Paper, and even were one, in 
consequence, well disposed towards the objectives of the proposed amend-
ments, there is no escaping the conclusion that section 96B is a failed attempt 
at legal and constitutional reform. This failure occurs because three false 
juridical distinctions underlie these proposals. 
First, the distinction between courts and tribunals, upon which the 
applicability of section 96B(1) turns, presupposes, incorrectly, that a system 
of legal ordering reflecting an idealized version of the Rule of Law may be 
differentiated from one resting upon what has been stigmatized as the Rule 
of Men. Second, the supervisory control elaborated in section 96B(2) is 
contingent upon the finding of jurisdictional error, which assumes, also 
incorrectly, that there can be a rational test for distinguishing between 
jurisdictional error and mere error of law. Third, the supervisory jurisdiction 
itself takes for granted the inevitability of an omnicompetent superior court, 
which belief depends on the questionable view that, as adjudicative bodies, 
superior courts have various innate attributes not shared by any other type 
of judicial tribunal. 
Each of the above beliefs is, of course, a product of a particular vision of 
the constitution popular about eighty years ago. Given its context, it is not 
surprising that this vision should have become so dominant. Nevertheless, 
this vision is wrong, and in the subsections which follow the consequences of 
its erroneousness will be explored in relation to the proposed section 96B. 
2.1. The Rule of Law and the Rule of Men 
Fundamental to the scheme envisioned by section 96B(1) is the drawing 
of a distinction between «real» courts and «administrative» tribunals. For 
the proposal does not contemplate correcting all problems with section 96, 
but only those relating to the « implied limitation on the power of provincial 
legislatures to assign functions to administrative tribunals. » To understand 
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the suggested distinction between courts and tribunals it is necessary to 
exhume 19th century legal theory. 
One of the pillars of Dicey's constitutional edifice is the distinction 
between the Rule of Law and the Rule of Men. For Dicey, the Rule of Law 
required that «ordinary courts» would act by applying known and pre-
existing legal rules to particular cases, and that in all circumstances, this 
judicial function would be performed in a non-political and objective 
fashion. The Rule of Men, by contrast, was an epithet attaching to all 
exercises of decision-making powers resting on discretion, policy and 
arbitrariness (e.g. not only to authorities such as Parliaments who make 
broadly political decisions, but also to any actor in a regime of special courts 
applying special rules for special cases). It is obvious that the omnicompetent 
superior court of section 96 is, under Dicey's conception, a Platonic form of 
the judicial tribunal bound by the Rule of Law, while the administrative 
tribunal exercising statutory discretions is its antithesis. 
It is impossible in this short essay to demonstrate in the smallest detail 
the variety of defects in this understanding of law and the judicial power. 
Moreover, others have done so at great length26. Nevertheless, two of 
Dicey's assumptions are particularly relevant to the present question and can 
be explored with profit. First of all, Dicey seems to hold that a society 
generates a legal system only through the ordering processes of legislation 
and adjudication. For him, a proper legal system presupposes a clear 
separation between legislative and judicial functions : the former being the 
political process by which normative choices are made and the latter being a 
neutral and objective process for applying such choices to particular cases. 
Modern social theorists know, however, that both aspects of this view are 
oversimplifications. Societies may be bound together by a variety of other 
ordering processes such as custom, contract, property regimes, mediation, 
resort to chance, and so on ; and no process (not even adjudication in its 
most pristine form) can ever be neutral and objective in the sense Dicey 
intended. 
In other words, not only is the decision to have recourse to any given 
social ordering mechanism such as adjudication the product of a political 
choice, but political choice pervades the operation of each of these processes. 
There is nothing natural or necessary about legislatures and courts as social 
institutions. Nor is there anything necessary about pretending that when 
such a model is adopted, all political choice may be delegated to the 
26. For present purposes the best brief dissection of Dicey is that undertaken by H.W. ARTHURS, 
« Rethinking Administrative Law : A Slightly Dicey Business», (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1. 
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legislature in order to preserve the neutrality of the courts. One might well 
wonder, if the Diceyan conception were really true, how to account for the 
entire phenomenon of the cemmon law. Would the common law not be the 
product of an implicit delegation by Parliament to the courts (with no policy 
guidelines whatsoever) of a jurisdiction to work out, on a case by case basis, 
the rules of private law? And would not such a delegation be a classic 
example of the Rule of Men ? 
A second doubtful element of the Rule of Law thesis is the theory of 
language upon which it rests. In order that Dicey may hold that all political 
decision-making occurs in the legislature he has to claim that linguistic 
directions can be formulated in such a way as to completely eliminate 
decisional discretion. Whatever may be the current belief of lawyers, no 
philosophers of repute continue to hold this view. One also suspects that, 
when shown the implications of this position, neither do lawyers. Otherwise, 
why would they be so resistant to non-legally trained persons sitting as 
judges ? If the legislature could formulate all its directives clearly and 
precisely, and if judging were nothing other than label reading, there would 
be little specialized content compressed into the idea of legal knowledge. 
It remains to demonstrate exactly how the proposals set out in the 
Discussion Paper are grounded in the Diceyan conception of law and 
legislation. As noted, a distinction is taken in section 96B(1), between a 
« tribunal, board, commission or authority» and a « court». Provinces will 
be authorized to delegate jurisdiction previously reserved to the superior, 
district and county courts only to tribunals. The Discussion Paper rightly 
points out that were this distinction not made, superior court authority 
could be undermined through jurisdictional transfers to other judicial 
bodies. But how is it proposed to draw this distinction? Simply by 
piggybacking on existing case law, which itself is grounded in Dicey's 
differentiation of the Rule of Law and the Rule of Men " . 
The Discussion Paper makes this point explicitly in its citation of the 
following paragraph from the decision in Shell Company of Australia v. 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation : 
It may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject : 1. A 
tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final 
decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or 
27. Representative cases showing this grounding are Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 
K.B. 171 ; In re Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act. 1934, [1934] 1 W.W. R. 535 (Man. 
CA.) ; Re: Ashby, [1934] O.R. 421 (CA.); Re Ness and Incorporated Canadian Racing 
Associations, [1946] O.R. 387 (CA.); Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation, [1938] A.C. 
415 (P.C.). 
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more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 
4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor 
because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a 
matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ([1924] 
1 K.B. 171)2\ 
Moreover, the Discussion Paper continues with a classic quotation from 
an article by D. M. Gordon, in which the differentiation of courts and 
tribunals is linked directly to the distinction between law and policy. Gordon 
states : 
A tribunal that dispenses justice, i.e. every judicial tribunal, is concerned with 
legal rights and liabilities, which means rights and liabilities conferred or 
imposed by « law»... 
In contrast, non-judicial tribunals of the type called «administrative» have 
invariably based their decisions and orders, not on legal rights and liabilities, 
but on policy and expediency. 
A judicial tribunal looks for some law to guide it; and «administrative» 
tribunal, within its province, is a law unto itself29. 
The upshot of these citations is simply that the Discussion Paper assumes 
that there can be a distinction between the Rule of Law and the Rule of Men, 
and that this distinction is crucial to distinguishing courts from tribunals. 
It is not my intention here to deny that when faced with making such 
distinctions, courts have by and large muddled their way through : one 
thinks of decisions on the availability of certiorari30, and the applicability of 
the rules of natural justice 31, or the scope of section 133 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867u. But surely if one is going to enact a constitutional amendment in 
part designed to clarify the uncertainty resulting from the current language 
of section 96 (which itself is grounded on the same distinction)33 it is 
necessary to have a better idea of the limits of the power being authorized 
than this pseudo-distinction seems to reveal. One does not solve an 
interpretational dilemma by enacting an amendment grounded in the same 
false dichotomy as the text originally giving rise to the dilemma. 
The final irony flowing from this first defect in the MacGuigan 
proposals is that the distinction itself suggests an expedient, which, if 
28. [1931] A.C. 275 (P.C.), p. 297. 
29. «Administrative Tribunalsand the Courts», (1933) 49 L.Q.R. 94, at pages 106, 107, 108. 
30. See Calgary Power v. Copilhone, [1959] S.C.R. 24; Saulnier v. Quebec Police Commission, 
[1976] 1 S.C.R. 572. 
31. See R. v. Church Assembly Legislative Committee, [1928] 1 K.B. 411. 
32. A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016. 
33. This point is made most explicitly in Lab. Rel. Bd. (Sask.) v. John East Iron Works Ltd., 
[1949] A.C. 134 (P.C.). 
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deployed craftily and selectively, could undermine the restriction imposed in 
section 96B(1). In other words, even were one able to distinguish courts and 
tribunals, the language of the amendment permits a reasonably inventive 
legislature to bring about indirectly an erosion of superior and county court 
jurisdiction. No doubt section 96B(1) would prevent the direct delegation of 
section 96 powers to the Provincial Court of Quebec or any similarly 
constituted judicial body34 ; but is it so clear that the proposal would 
proscribe the delegation of such powers to a number of administrative 
tribunals? For example, would it not be possible to establish a plethora of 
specialized private law administrative tribunals, to which are delegated 
broad judicial, legislative and administrative powers, all closely interrelated 
in a coherent and explicit policy context? 
Today, provincial administrative tribunals are of two main types : 
quasi-public regulatory agencies such as Transport Boards, Energy Boards, 
Social Welfare Commissions, Municipal Commissions and so on ; and 
specialized tribunals with extensive jurisdiction in purely private law fields 
such as Landlord and Tenant Law, Consumer Law, Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, Automobile Accident Compensation Law, Labour Relations Law, 
Mental Incompetency, and Adoption. Heretofore, the only limit on the 
jurisdictional authority of these specialized private law tribunals has been 
that arising from section 96. Never have the courts intimated that entire 
areas of provincial property and civil rights jurisdiction are reserved 
exclusively to judicial (as opposed to administrative) tribunals35. 
To put it at its highest, there is currently no constitutional reason why a 
provincial legislature could not create specialized tribunals to administer, 
chapter by chapter, the entire Civil Code. Examples of fields of private law 
particularly suitable for such treatment are not difficult to conjure. Imagine 
a tribunal styled the Estates Administration and Family Dependant's 
Protection Board, to which would be delegated jurisdiction to probate 
testamentary dispositions, to levy succession duties, to administer the 
transfer of inheritances to abintestate and testamentary beneficiaries, to 
administer all testamentary substitutions and trusts, to evaluate claims for 
dependent's relief and to interpret (in the fashion of a labour arbitrator) 
testamentary documents. Assuming that such a Board were given sufficient 
34. See Séminaire de Chicoutimi v. Cité de Chicoutimi, [1973] S.R.C. 681; A.G. Quebec v. 
Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 ; Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714; 
Crevier v. A.G. Quebec, (1982) 137 D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.). 
35. Of course, in the Residential Tenancies Reference and in the recent decision of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, Desmeules c. Le prêt hypothécaire et ai, [1983] CA. 43, the courts assert 
that what is reserved to section 96 courts is authority in respect of the <• adjudicating 
relationship» where matters historically vested in the Superior Court are in issue. 
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administrative and legislative powers, and were permitted to develop its own 
procedural and policy rules within a broad policy mandate established by the 
legislature, (that is, assuming that its judicial-type powers were couched in 
an appropriate institutional setting)36 it would be difficult not to characterize 
it as a tribunal rather than a court. By deploying such an expedient one could 
drain much of the current law of successions from the jurisdiction of the 
existing Superior Court of Quebec. 
Of course, until now the main reason why most provinces have not 
undertaken such a radical reconceptualization of private law is the prohibi-
tion of section 96. Since the jurisdiction of superior and district courts simply 
could not be transferred to any decision-maker not appointed by the 
Governor General, administrative tribunals created in pursuit of the above 
goal either would be emasculated at the point of ultimate adjudication, or 
would be so structurally unorthodox as to be politically unacceptable. That 
is, currently, to meet the Residential Tenancies criteria an elaborate (or 
fictitious) institutional setting would have to be established. 
However, because section 96B(1) would permit the transfer of even 
superior court jurisdiction to an administrative board or agency, the 
provinces will have an incentive to engage in a proliferation of non-judicial 
tribunals. The prohibition against delegating section 96 powers to bodies 
which are, formally, courts is a chimera. Once the substance of section 96 
jurisdiction may be transferred to appropriately constituted provincial 
tribunals, the superior court has been emptied of its jurisdiction just the 
same3 7 . And does anyone really doubt that some provinces will avail 
themselves of the opportunities section 96B(1) affords them? 
2.2. Errors of Law and Errors of Jurisdiction 
The federal proposals also rest on the view that jurisdictional errors are 
qualitatively different from ordinary errors of law, fact or policy. Sec-
tion 96B(2) would have it that the exercise of any powers delegated to a 
tribunal under section 96B(1) would remain subject to superior court judicial 
review on the basis of «want or excess of jurisdiction». In order to 
36. See Tomko v. Lab. Rel. Bd. (N.S.), [1977] I S.C.R. 112 and Desmeules for discussions of 
when an institutional setting is appropriate. 
37. This position has been characterized by supporters of section 96B as the bogeyman thesis. 
One wonders, if indeed this position is implausible, why the Supreme Court felt obliged to 
come down so firmly in Crevier and McEvoyl 
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appreciate the significance of this distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional errors it is necessary to recall certain basics of administrative 
law theory38. 
In the Anglo-Canadian tradition, one aspect of the doctrine of Supre-
macy of Parliament is that courts must apply the law as enacted by 
legislatures, assuming that the legislation is constitutionally intra vires. 
Hence, should Parliament confer jurisdiction upon a non-judicial decision-
maker, the courts have no authority to question the wisdom of this choice. 
Moreover, should Parliament provide that the decision taken is to be final 
and without appeal, in deference to this wish the Courts will not entertain a 
consideration of a case upon its merits. The adjudicative role of the courts is 
limited to ensuring that the Parliamentary delegate acts within the confines 
of his statutory authority or jurisdiction. This supervisory function of the 
superior courts, therefore, presupposes the drawing of a distinction between 
those decisions taken within a delegate's jurisdiction and those which he has 
no jurisdiction to take. 
Is this, in practice, a distinction which can be sustained as a prescriptive 
norm, or can any decision of law, fact or policy be converted into a question 
of jurisdiction? Let us accept, as least for the sake of argument, that there 
can be (i) errors of law which are not jurisdictional errors (even if they may 
be in certain cases subject to judicial review by certiorari or otherwise), 
(ii) errors of fact which are not jurisdictional errors, and (iii) errors of policy 
that do not amount to an asking of the wrong question or a fettering of 
discretion. It is still necessary to inquire whether this is an exhaustive or 
exclusive typology, or whether the same decision may be subject to several 
characterizations. In another place I have developed an inventory of 27 
kinds of jurisdictional error recognized in Canadian administrative law". 
With such an arsenal of weapons it is not surprising that courts are able to 
locate jurisdictional errors almost at will. 
Moreover, as several recent Supreme Court decisions suggest, it is 
always possible to convert any error into an error of jurisdiction, should this 
be necessary to sustain judicial review where thought desirable. In other 
words, the complexity of modern legislative schemes, in combination with 
the resources of statutory interpretation now available to courts, leads to a 
situation where the characterization of any determination of a tribunal as 
erroneous, and the treatment of such error as jurisdictional has become little 
more than an exercise in ratiocination. 
38. For an excellent general analysis see G.E. LEDAIN, «The Supervisory Jurisdiction in 
Quebec», (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 788. 
39. R. A. MACDONALD, « Absence of jurisdiction: a perspective», (1983)43 R. du B. 307. 
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It follows that, other than in the realm of pure theory, there is no valid a 
priori distinction between errors within jurisdiction and errors going to 
jurisdiction. As long as the parties to a dispute have enough money to engage 
counsel with enough ingenuity (or disingenuity) to convince a reviewing 
court of the seriousness of their problem, they will have access to a superior 
court to challenge and overturn any determination of an administrative 
tribunal. The distinction between jurisdictional errors and errors within 
jurisdiction has no prescriptive force, even if it is a convenient descriptive 
device. 
Surprisingly, the coherence of the scheme set out in the Discussion 
Paper depends heavily on this distinction. Section 96B(2) provides for 
judicial review for «want or excess of jurisdiction » whenever a provincial 
legislature confers superior court authority under section 96B(1). In these 
cases, the supervisory function of the superior court cannot be sterilized by a 
privative clause. While the legal proposition enshrined by section 96B(2) is 
not novel40, the federal Discussion Paper seems to reveal a rather naive 
conception of what courts are currently holding to be jurisdictional error. 
Thus, the draft would seem to restrict the concept to its pre-Anisminic status, 
even though recent Canadian jurisprudence suggests a broader view. The 
unfortunate choice of the expression «want or excess of jurisdiction» by 
preference to terminology such as «jurisdictional error» or more generally 
« the supervisory jurisdiction » is at the root of this problem. In consequence, 
while some sort of jurisdictional control may be preserved by section 96B(2), 
it may well not extend to all those grounds for judicial review currently 
recognized in Canada, including fairness. Such a possibility only reinforces 
earlier observations about the aleatory nature of the concept of jurisdictional 
error. Not only must counsel continue to engage in gymnastics to convert 
«errors» into «jurisdictional errors», but now they must recharacterize all 
«jurisdictional errors» into errors relating to some presumed sub-set 
thereof, « want or excess of jurisdiction ». 
One is driven to the conclusion that, far from facilitating the establish-
ment and functioning of provincial administrative tribunals, the only 
practical effect of these proposals would seem to be to impose a mandatory 
barrier to market entry. The barrier is access to expertise in legal technology 
and the market is judicial control by superior courts. Anyone who doubts 
this proposition need only consider the jurisprudence of the Superior Court 
of Quebec in labour relations matters. Realistically, the preservation of 
jurisdictional control under section 96B(2) may well turn out to be a 
40. Sec supra, cases cited ;it note 34; see also SCOTT, •• The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties», 
(1976) 14 Alia. Law Rev. 103. 
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mechanism for the courts to take back the jurisdiction which has been given 
to tribunals under section 96B(1). In the process, section 96B(2) will 
encourage unduly complicated language in enabling legislation, and dissi-
mulating judicial acrobatics in review judgments41. 
Notwithstanding the excessive preoccupation of recent decades with 
manipulating the theory of jurisdiction in order to overcome the limitations 
inherent in jurisdictional review stricto sensu, provinces wishing to delegate 
section 96B(1) authority to administrative tribunals may impede, if not 
substantially oust section 96B(2) review. To appreciate the possibilities, 
however, some political realism about section 96 reform is required. While 
provincial authorities usually claim that they seek only to enhance adminis-
trative efficiency by integrating judicial powers into non-adversarial and 
non-adjudicative agency processes, and to ensure that boards and commis-
sions genuinely pursue their policy mandates by making office-holders 
politically accountable to the cabinet, astute observers suggest a third 
motive : the desire to minimize federal political interference masquerading as 
the Rule of Law and the independence of the judiciary42. 
Should the provinces finally decide to make this political conflict 
visible, and at the same time, overcome the restrictions imposed by 
section 96B(2), existing administrative law jurisdictional theory provides the 
ideal vehicle for accomplishing this goal. That is, if one takes the theories of 
Parliamentary supremacy and jurisdiction seriously, the practical effect of a 
superior court's power of judicial review can be minimized. Ironically, 
because the concept of a priori jurisdictional error is incoherent, and can be 
used by courts to exercise a quasi-appellate power, this incoherence permits 
legislatures dedicated to the task to sterilize judicial review. 
A first means to exploit the limits of the theory of jurisdictional review 
is to infuse each element of an inferior tribunal's jurisdiction with a 
maximum of subjectivity. Even before the Crevier case brought the point 
back to the forefront, Rule of Law theorists lamented the opportunities 
presented by subjective grants of decision-making power. As noted in the 
McRuer Report : 
The most effective and commonly used device for limiting judicial review of 
action taken by a tribunal is to include subjective ingredients in the powers 
conferred on the tribunal43. 
41. See CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,« A Response to the Minister of Justice on the Discussion 
Paper — The Constitution of Canada : a suggested amendment relating to provincial 
administrative tribunals» (August, 1983) for an analysis of this problem. 
42. See MATAS, «Validating Administrative Tribunals», a paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, June 28, 1984. 
43. J.C. MCRUER, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report no 1, Vol 1, Toronto, 
Queen's Printer, 1968-71, p. 275. 
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In its extreme form this technique would be translated by a delegation to a 
board of authority to take all decisions of law, fact, policy and procedure not 
on the basis of any pre-existing rules, but on the basis of any factors which it, 
in its sole discretion thought appropriate. Of course, to be realistic, recourse 
to anything remotely ressembling such broad delegations is politically 
unthinkable in areas other than National Security or its analogues. But the 
point is that the control is less legal than political ; there is a significant range 
of subjectivity which today could pass both legal and political muster. 
A second component in any scheme to restrict the scope of judicial 
review would be to confer substantive jurisdiction upon all tribunals in the 
broadest language possible. After all, there is no constitutional reason other 
than section 96 which prevents a provincial government from delegating to 
any one of its tribunals authority to make determinations in respect of every 
matter falling within provincial legislative power under section 92. Once 
again, however, even given section 96B, political realities would prevent the 
delegation of concurrent jurisdiction over the entire range of section 92 to 
every provincial tribunal. But there is a broad scope for more general 
(though limited) jurisdictional delegations ; the present jurisdiction of the 
Provincial Court and its various divisions reflects some of these possibilities. 
If deployed concurrently these two manoeuvres could go a long way to 
trivializing section 96B(2). Let me offer an extreme (and, I assume ludicrous) 
example to illustrate the point. Suppose a province wished to insulate a 
Residential Tenancies Tribunal from judicial review on grounds of want or 
excess of jurisdiction. It would begin by delegating to it the power to make 
final, non-appealable determinations in respect of all matters of provincial 
law under section 92 : the tribunal would be given the power to make 
determinations in matters of family law, property law, gifts, wills, successions, 
obligations, and so on, to the extent such determinations were necessary, in 
the opinion of the tribunal, for the proper exercise of its authority. Through 
such an expedient the invention of jurisdictional facts such as those found in 
Re Zwicker™ could, in theory, be avoided. 
Moreover, to overcome the problem raised in the Bell4i case, where the 
court usurped the power of a tribunal to interpret its constituant statute, the 
province simply delegates to the Residential Tenancies Commission the 
authority to decide, in respect of each question of law sustaining its 
jurisdiction, the meaning of the terms enacted by the legislature. Further, so 
that this wide grant of authority could not be seen as a general «jurisdiction 
44. (1947)3 D.L.R. 195 (N.S.S.C). 
45. [1971] S.C.R. 756. 
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to determine jurisdiction » device, which would run afoul of Crevier*6, each 
of these constituent elements would be specified in detail and defined 
subjectively. 
Again, in order to prevent the ex post facto judicial imposition of 
procedural rules such as fairness or natural justice (which, after all are 
merely implied by the courts when the legislature is silent) the tribunal would 
be expressly authorized to establish its own procedures as it sees fit, and 
would be exempted from following any «common law» procedural rules. 
The objective of this exercise is, obviously, to establish an institutional 
structure bearing as little ressemblance as possible to the judicial model. The 
more the procedures of the tribunal depart from the adversarial, adjudicative 
model, the less judicial implication of the audi alteram partem and nemo 
iudex principles is plausible. 
Finally, to avoid decisions such as that taken in the Metropolitan Life" 
case, the tribunal must be delegated the power to determine any question 
which it, in its sole discretion decides is necessary for the exercise of its 
authority. Decision-makers would be empowered to take decisions based not 
only on the terms of enabling statute (which they alone are authorized to 
interpret) and the facts (again, which they, in their sole discretion are entitled 
to find) but also on the basis of any principles of equity and public policy 
which they, in their absolute discretion, are entitled to invent or find 
applicable to the case to be determined. 
In this convoluted example one sees the limits of the theory of 
jurisdiction. By constituting tribunal jurisdiction in this fashion, only 
questions which have at the same time a constitutional element — that is, 
which raise a problem of the distribution of legislative authority under 
sections 91 and 92 — will be reviewable under section 96B(2). Of course, the 
current conception of jurisdiction will also have been emptied of all possible 
significance. In other words, formally there is no impediment to a province 
attempting a similar manoeuvre. Yet it is obvious that at a certain point far 
short ofthat mooted, the court will simply intervene and invent jurisdictional 
error. Nevertheless, unless courts are prepared to plunge the country into a 
constitutional crisis, it is apparent that some lesser combination of these 
expedients will be successful in at least limiting superior court review even 
under section 96B(2). And, once again, is it to be doubted that some 
provinces will seize the initiative? 
46. (1982) 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); see also R.A. MACDONALD, .< Crevier v. A.G. Quebec», 
(1983) 17 U.B.C. Law Rev. 111. 
47. [1970] S.C.R. 425. 
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2.3. Superior and Inferior Courts 
The third questionable distinction reflected in the federal proposals goes 
to the heart of the section 96 imbroglio. Section 96B(2) provides that 
decisions of tribunals exercising superior court jurisdiction conferred under 
section 96B(1) are reviewable « by a superior court of the Province». In other 
words, the distinction between inferior and superior courts continues to 
pervade both sections 96 and 96B. Understanding the theoretical difference 
between these types of court also requires some historical research. 
From a functional perspective, it is usually argued that, at common law 
and under the Judicature Acts, a superior court was possessed of three 
exclusive jurisdictional attributes. First, the court had a jurisdiction rationae 
materiae; that is, in respect of the underlying subject matter of the case 
before it. Thus, jurisdiction to try persons charged with murder resides in the 
superior court. Second, the court had a technical and remedial jurisdiction ; 
that is, in respect of the kinds of orders and other remedies which it could 
issue. Thus, the authority to grant declarations, injunctions, writs of 
certiorari, eviction orders, and so on, and the power to decide questions of 
law on appeal were, in principle, reserved to the superior court. Finally, the 
court had a jurisdiction which may be called its constitutional jurisdiction ; 
that is, its power to determine without review the extent of its own 
jurisdiction. Thus, the authority to supervise the jurisdiction of all other 
judicial tribunals was exclusive to the superior court. 
If this absolutist formulation of superior court attributes at common 
law were ever true, which many commentators now doubt4 8 , there are good 
reasons for questioning its applicability in post-Confederation Canada. The 
constitutional division of powers, the structure of sections 96 and 101, and 
the principle enshrined in Valin v. Langlois49 suggest that the common law 
theory of a superior court cannot be engrafted without nuance onto the 
meaning of Superior Court in section 96. Thus, in recent years, when the 
Supreme Court has been confronted with a constitutional challenge based 
upon the section (i.e. when it must attempt to state the attributes of a 
superior court), it has adopted a mode of analysis which collapses these three 
dimensions. For example, in the Residential Tenancies Reference it approach-
ed the question whether a provincial tribunal was exercising superior court 
authority by asking : 
Is the power broadly conformable to the jurisdiction formerly exercised by 
section 96 courts? If not the law is intra vires. If the power is identical or 
48. See D.J. MULLAN, «The Uncertain Constitutional Position of Canada's Administrative 
Appeal Tribunals», (1982) 14 Oil. Law Rev. 239. 
49. (1879) 3 S.C.R. 1. 
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analogous to a power exercised by a Section 96 court at Confederation, one 
should proceed to step 2. Can the function still be considered a «judicial» one 
when viewed within the institutional setting in which it appears ? If not, the law 
is intra vires. If so, one should proceed to the third step. If the power or 
jurisdiction is exercised in a judicial manner, is that power merely subsidiary or 
ancillary to the general administrative function of the tribunal or necessarily 
incidental to the achievement of a broader policy goal of the legislature, in 
which case it will be valid, or is it the sole or central function of the tribunal, in 
which case it will be held to be invalid 50. 
In other words, for the Supreme Court, the litmus test for a section 96 
superior court is not related to an abstract inventory of the kinds of powers 
being exercised (i.e. is not a purely historical exercise). 
But, to appreciate how the Supreme Court came to this view, let us 
examine the section 96 question from the former perspective. Can it be said 
today that there is a certain jurisdiction rationae materiae which is the 
exclusive preserve of the superior court? Since the Residential Tenancies 
Reference it would seem that provided that the inferior delegate of such 
powers exercises them within an appropriate institutional setting in an 
ancillary and limited fashion, the answer is no. As a consequence of the 
Tomko decision a similar conclusion is probably in order with respect to the 
remedial and technical powers of the inferior tribunals. Most types of 
judicial orders seem now to be within the resort of inferior bodies : 
injunctions, declaratory orders, contempt citations, damages actions, incar-
ceration orders, etc. can now all be rendered, again given the appropriate 
institutional setting and their subsidiary or ancillary character. Finally, and 
despite the Crevier case, it is not clear exactly what the scope of the 
superintending power of the Superior Court is, and whether the power to 
commit jurisdictional error remains an attribute of such courts. 
This last point requires some clarification. There seems to be little doubt 
that a line of cases commencing with the Séminaire de Chicoutimi decision 
stands for the proposition that provincial inferior courts may not exercise 
the superintending power. On the other hand, section 101 would seem to 
permit federal inferior tribunals to claim this jurisdiction. That is, even 
though the Federal Court is styled as a superior court, such characterization 
is unnecessary to sustain its judicial review jurisdiction under sections 18 and 
2851. The second element of a superior court's constitutional jurisdiction has 
been held to be its own authority to err as to jurisdiction. This, of course, is 
the proposition enshrined by Crevier. But others have argued that since 
50. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714. 
51. See the l'Anglais decision, supra, note 22. 
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superior courts are always subject to correction by the Court of Appeal, 
practically speaking, they exercise a limited jurisdiction52. In other words, 
the supposed unassailable distinction between superior and inferior courts is 
not as clear in practice as in theory. 
Because the scheme set out in the Discussion Paper contemplates 
creating an exception to section 96, which itself requires differentiating 
superior and inferior courts, it is obvious that this difficult distinction is 
crucial to section 96B. As noted, when provinces deploy section 96B(1) to 
confer section 96 powers on their tribunals, decisions of these tribunals are 
reviewable by a superior court. Interestingly, there is a significant difference 
in the wording of sections 96B(1) and 96B(2). While the appointing power of 
the Governor General extends to County and District courts as well as to 
Superior courts, and while section 96B(1) makes no distinction between 
these insofar as the extended power of the provincial legislatures is concerned, 
for some reason section 96B(2) speaks only of superior court jurisdiction 
being subject to review. Thus, to determine the potential exposure of a 
provincial tribunal to review, the proposal requires a further assessment of 
the jurisdiction of a superior court. 
But the actual draft of section 96B raises other concerns. For example, 
unless section 96B(1) were to be read as actually constituting provincial 
authorities as a species of superior court (which is improbable given the 
text), section 96B(2) is probably superfluous. The Supreme Court decision in 
Crevier suggests that all provincial administrative tribunals (which necessarily 
are inferior tribunals) are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
superior courts on jurisdictional grounds. Surely it is not the intention of the 
drafters of section 96B(2) to distinguish between tribunals upon which 
superior court jurisdiction has been conferred under section 96B(1) and 
other provincial tribunals; namely those upon which County and District 
Court jurisdiction has been conferred under section 96B(1), and those upon 
which no section 96 jurisdiction has been conferred. For if this were the case, 
then the former would be subject to judicial review under section 96B(2) and 
the latter subject to some sort of common law judicial review jurisdiction. 
It requires no great insight to see the folly of the proposal if this is the 
intended result. To begin with, why should the reviewability of all decisions 
of a provincial authority be determined on the basis that one or more of its 
decisions are section 96-type decisions ? If we have learned anything over the 
past sixty years of judicial review it must be that characterization of a 
tribunal is a hazardous business, and should not be attempted when a 
52. This point is argued forcefully in H.P. GLENN, «La responsabilité des juges», (1983) 28 
McGill L. J. 228. 
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characterization of a power will suffice53. Moreover, to the extent that 
section 96B(2) review may be narrower than common law review (which the 
Discussion Paper suggests), this would seem to permit provincial legislatures 
to in fact reduce the scope of judicial review by conferring superior court 
powers on existing tribunals. Those who think that this latter concern is 
purely academic, and believe that a legislative definition of a common law 
concept (i.e. jurisdiction) is not problematic need only examine the fate of 
section 28( 1) of the Federal Court Act for evidence that judicial interpretation 
of the two concepts of jurisdiction is unlikely to be identical54. 
Perhaps the final irony with the federal proposals is that, even were one 
to believe that section 96B(2) protects the most distinctive attributes of the 
superior Court (i.e. the pristine adjudicative function and the superintending 
power), the door is open for the provinces to exploit the amendment. 
Because the Act of 1867 enshrined a conception of the judicial function 
which is historically contingent, we often forget that this conception of a 
court is neither the only acceptable conception nor the conception out of 
which the common law tradition emerged. At the time of Confederation, 
several competing superior court jurisdictions existed in England : most 
notably, courts of Common Law, of Equity, Mercantile Courts and Eccle-
siastical Courts. The subsumption of these competing jurisdictions into a 
hierarchical arrangement crowned by a unitary and omnicompetent Superior 
Court was only the achievement ofthe Judicature Acts towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
This suggests a means for capitalizing upon the uncertainty of the 
conception of a superior court. The court created in the last century was 
given the task of regulating conflicts between various inferior jurisdictions 
and deciding jurisdictional disputes between itself and inferior courts. In 
Canada at least, the possibility of co-equal superior courts competing for 
jurisdiction was eliminated by the Judicature Acts. Only recently, in the 
l'Anglais case, did this issue resurface. But if the proposals in the Discussion 
Paper are adopted, such jurisdictional conflicts could become commonplace. 
What would be the consequence, for example, if one of the superior court 
powers delegated to a tribunal under section 96B(1) were precisely the 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction? In such a hypothesis, and 
again assuming that the tribunal were not a court within the meaning of 
section 96B(1), it would require deft manoeuvring by the pre-existing 
53. The tortuous route from Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171 to Ridge v. 
Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L.) illustrates perfectly this point. 
54. See the litany set out in G. PÉPIN and Y. OUELLETTE, Principes de contentieux administratif, 
2e éd., Cowansville, Éd. Yvon Biais, 1982, p. 393 à 421. 
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superior court to ground any review jurisdiction under section 96B(2). That 
is, the court would have to decide that gift of the power to err as to 
jurisdiction is not « a matter within the legislative authority of the Province». 
Should it do so, the conflict of interest built into our current theory of 
judicial review would then be manifest. Each time the superior court declares 
an inferior tribunal to have exceeded its jurisdiction, by that very act the 
superior court augments its own jurisdiction. 
From the foregoing discussion it follows that it is possible (at least in 
theory) to replicate the attributes of a superior court in a provincial tribunal 
created under section 96B(1). In other words, even though provincial 
authority is theoretically limited to the creation of agencies, boards and 
tribunals, if these bodies may indeed err as to jurisdiction, then they may 
proceed to engage in essentially unreviewable judicial type activities. For 
upon review the role of the superior court would be limited simply to noting 
that the inferior tribunal was exercising jurisdiction which, but for sec-
tion 96B(1), it would have no authority to assert. This is hardly a result to be 
applauded even by the most die-hard proponents of administrative auto-
nomy ; yet it is exactly the result which at least some provincial governments 
are eager to achieve. 
2.4. Section 96B Reconsidered 
The proposals set out in the Discussion Paper, although interesting, are 
in the final analysis, ill-conceived and not well drafted. If they are promul-
gated in their current form, they are certain to provoke a proliferation of 
inferior tribunals, which will no doubt be as poorly structured as many 
existing administrative agencies. These proposals will also encourage broad 
grants of jurisdiction and subjective delegations of power. Lastly, they will 
induce provinces to create tribunals bearing the least resemblance possible to 
courts both in respect of procedures they must follow and in respect of how 
they must justify their decisions. 
In this section various extreme examples of the type of legislative 
tinkering likely to be generated by section 96B were raised. In each case, the 
example suggested the following two conclusions : (i) should these proposals 
be enacted, the theory of judicial review now in place will not prevent either 
the erosion of superior court authority, or the suppression of judicial review ; 
(ii) nevertheless, at a certain point the superior courts will not tolerate this 
erosion or suppression and will simply strike down provincial inferior courts 
parading as tribunals, or invent new grounds for judicial review to control 
unacceptable tribunal decisions theoretically taken within jurisdiction. 
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But, and this is the key point, these proposals are an invitation to the 
provinces to try to exploit the superior courts. Politically, we cannot expect 
the judiciary to constantly have to react negatively in order to defend its 
jurisdiction by voiding popular (but excessive) provincial measures. In other 
words, despite the intellectualist incoherencies just reviewed, the scheme of 
section 96B can be made to work ; courts will develop criteria for distinguish-
ing tribunals from courts, errors of law from errors of jurisdiction, and 
inferior courts from superior courts. But they will do so at the cost of their 
own credibility, for it will be obvious that these criteria represent ex post 
facto political judgments rather than a priori prescriptive norms. Far from 
reducing the administrative and political conflicts consequent upon sec-
tion 96, these proposals will politicize the superior courts even further. 
Conclusion 
Because proponents of reform to section 96 have never really articulated 
what they conceive the section 96 problem to be, it is difficult to know 
exactly what the object of the amendment advanced in the Discussion Paper 
is : are the proposals intended to undermine the hegemony of the superior 
courts? are they intended to permit provinces to create a vast array of 
specialized tribunals? are they intended to provide a legislative text upon 
which to constitutionalize judicial review in the manner noted in Crevierl 
It has not been my purpose here to offer a theory of the judicial power. 
Yet, if one is truly interested in rethinking the regime of section 96 in order to 
accomplish any or all of these goals, the development of such a theory is a 
prerequisite. And even in a rudimentary elaboration this theory would reveal 
that there are much better ways of accomplishing the objective. In short, 
even accepting that an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867 is required, 
several alternatives seem preferable to that noted in the Discussion Paper. 
First of all, one could decide that a dual court system such as that 
existing in the United States is to be preferred to our so-called unitary 
system. This, I doubt is a viable proposition. However, one could (if it is 
thought that the real issue is the political balance of power between federal 
and provincial governments) provide for a joint nomination process or, (if 
certain Senate reforms are ever undertaken), establish an advise and consent 
jurisdiction in the Senate for Superior Court appointments. 
On the other hand, if the real problem is perceived to be the decapitation 
of administrative tribunals by the exercise of a judicial jurisdiction unsympa-
thetic to the goals being pursued by the agency itself, one could provide for 
an administrative panel of the existing superior courts where all such 
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supervisory powers would be exercised. In some measure the Divisional 
Court scheme of Ontario could easily be adapted to this goal. 
Third, if the problem is that judicial assumptions often confuse and 
undermine administrative policy, one could decide to set up a scheme of 
joint nominations to the upper reaches of provincial agencies. By building a 
judicial component into administrative boards, judges can be sensitized to 
the value structure of administrative law. This of course, is the strategy that 
has been attempted with the Unified Family Courts. 
Finally, if the underlying fear which sustains superior court review is the 
politicization of administrative tribunals, the solution would be to extend the 
constraints upon the provincial government currently in place under various 
provincial Judges Acts to all major administrative agencies exercising 
section 96 type powers. Since guarantees relating to security of tenure, salary 
and jurisdiction generate an ideology of independence for courts, they 
should do likewise for administrative tribunals. 
Because it is not clear from either the proposals or the explanation of 
«provincial concerns» advanced in the Discussion Paper exactly what the 
section 96 problem is, one is left with the suspicion that the present 
controversy is merely the latest round in federal/provincial jurisdictional 
sparring. For the claim that section 96 restricts provincial power to conceive 
novel solutions for legal problems has never been seriously tested : to date, 
what administrative scheme relying on mediational, consultative, contractual 
or other non-adjudicative process has run afoul of section 96? The vast 
majority of unsuccessful provincial initiatives have arisen from attempts to 
expand judicial, not administrative jurisdiction. 
It is also to be remembered that section 96 challenges rarely arise in the 
abstract. Most cases are decided in the context of a lis inter partes where 
section 96 is seen by one side as an additional argument to advance in order 
to obtain a favourable decision. For this reason the argument against the 
section loses much of its constitutional force. What is more, judicial review 
addicts in the profession will soon leave section 96 behind; they have the 
Charter of Rights now to amuse them. 
If, in the final analysis, it is necessary to conclude that section 96B cannot 
be considered seriously as a solution to difficulties posed by sections 96-101 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal Discussion Paper has at least one 
important merit. For the first time, it requires lawyers to reflect upon the 
Judicature provisions of the Act of 1867 other than as a mere incident to the 
jurisdiction and composition of the Supreme Court. It is essential that late-
nineteenth century prejudices about courts and law now be reconsidered, 
and that realistic debate about the judicial function in Canada begin at last. 
